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INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been public debate about the role of religious faith
in the performance of judicial duty, especially the role of the Catholic faith in
the performance of the duties of a federal judge. During my confirmation
hearing in June 2003,1 a few members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
raised questions about my "deeply held ''2 beliefs, and whether I was "asserting
an agenda of [my] own, a religious belief of [my] own, inconsistent with
separation of church and state."3 When Chairman Hatch responded to these
statements by asking me about my religion4 and then asserting that "in every
case" he could see, I had "followed the law regardless of [my] personal, deeply
felt, strongly felt religious beliefs," 5 two other Senators objected to Chairman
Hatch's reference to my religion.
6
Later that summer, an interest group sponsored political advertisements that
described opponents of my confirmation to the federal bench as engaged in
discrimination against me based on my Catholic faith.7 The advertisement
portrayed a sign that read, "Catholics need not apply," hanging on a door to a
f Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. I was assisted in my
thinking about the subject of this Essay by my participation in a panel discussion of the role of religion
in judging at the 2005 Sarah Smith Memorial Conference on Moral Leadership organized by the Yale
Center for Faith and Culture and jointly sponsored by the Yale Law School and the Yale Divinity
School. I am indebted to the participants in that panel discussion, especially our moderator, Professor
Stephen Carter. I also thank Thomas Berg, Gerard Bradley, Robert P. George, and Jay Sekulow for their
comments and suggestions about an earlier draft of this Essay. On January 24, 2006, I delivered an
earlier version of this Essay at the University of Notre Dame as the inaugural of its lecture series
"Catholic Think Tank America."
1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of William H. Pryor, Jr. to be Circuit Judge for the
Eleventh Circuit Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003).
2. Id. at 11-13 (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer).
3. Id. at 90 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin); see also id. at 76 (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein).
4. Id. at 104-05 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
5. Id. at 106 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
6. Id. at 107-08 (statements of Sen. Patrick Leahy and Sen. Arlen Specter).
7. Charles Hurt, Democrats Target Religious Belief of Bush Judicial Nominee, WASH. TIMES (Nat'l
Wkly. Ed.), July 28, 2003, at 5.
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federal courthouse. 8 That advertisement created a furor in the Senate and a
lively debate in national newspapers and magazines.
9
In 2005, controversies arose about the religious faith of nominees to the
Supreme Court. After John Roberts was nominated to serve as Chief Justice,
there was a report that a Senator had asked Roberts in a private meeting what
Roberts would do in a conflict between his Catholic faith and the performance
of his judicial duty. Roberts allegedly said he would recuse himself.10 The
report provoked a firestorm of criticism,1 but the Senator asserted that the
report was erroneous. 12 Later, when Harriet Miers was nominated to serve as an
associate justice, there was a debate about the relevance of her evangelical
Christian faith to both her nomination and possible service as a judge.' 3 After
Ms. Miers asked the President to withdraw her nomination, a new controversy
arose when another Catholic, Sam Alito, was nominated to the Supreme Court.
The Alito nomination sparked new questions, because his appointment would
mean that a majority of five of the nine members of the Supreme Court would
be Catholic. 14
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Richard John Neuhaus, The Public Square, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2003, at 91-92; Charles
Krauthammer, Editorial, A Judge Prejudged, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 2003, at A23; John Mallon, Op-Ed.,
Bias and Judicial Nominees, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2003, at A15; Robert Novak, Editorial, Unmasking
Religious Code Words, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at 37; Editorial, Playing the Religion Card,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003, at A12; Terry Eastland, Catholic Baiting, DAILY STANDARD, Aug. 6, 2003,
http://www.theweeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articies/000/000/002/957edgkx.asp; Ami Eden,
Confirmation Debate Morphs into Bitter Religious Battle, FORWARD, Aug. 8, 2003,
http://www.forward.com/issues/2003/03.08.08/news4.html; Jonah Goldberg, Dems Want To Bench
Judges of Faith, TOWNHALL.COM, Aug. 6, 2003, http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/
jonahgoldberg/2003/08/06/160933.html; Hugh Hewitt, The Catholic Test, DAILY STANDARD, Aug. 5,
2003, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/956qpnnx.asp; Michael
Novak, "Deeply Held" Feelings, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Aug. 4, 2003, http://www.nationalreview.com/
novak/novak08O4O3.asp.
10. Jonathan Turley, The Faith of John Roberts, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at BI 1.
11. See Charles Hurt, Durbin Disputes Column on Roberts, WASH. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A12
[hereinafter Durbin Disputes]; Charles Hurt, Durbin Was Source for Column About Roberts, WASH.
TIMES, July 27, 2005, at A10 [hereinafter Durbin Was Source]; David D. Kirkpatrick, Skirmish over a
Query About Roberts's Faith, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A13; Letter from Henry J. Hyde,
Congressman, U.S. Congress, to Richard Durbin, Senator, U.S. Senate (July 28, 2005), available at
http://www.frc.org/get.cfin?i=LH05GO7&v=PRINT; see also, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Editorial, Why It's
Right To Ask About Roberts's Faith, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2005, at A13, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/01/AR-2005080101430.htm; Cathy
Young, Op-Ed., Why Roberts's Religion Matters, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2005, at A 11; Meet the Press
(MSNBC cable television broadcast Aug. 7, 2005) (Interview by Tim Russert of Mario Cuomo and
Douglas Kmiec), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8714275.
12. Durbin Disputes, supra note 11; Durbin Was Source, supra note 11.
13. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Leading by (Bad) Example, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at A21;
William F. Buckley, Jr., So She's a Christian?, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Oct. 21, 2005,
http://www.nationalreview.com/buckley/wfb200510211621.asp; Bush Cites Religion as Reason for
Picking Miers, MSNBC.cOM, Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9673338; The NewsHour
with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Oct. 14, 2005) (Interview by Jim Lehrer of David Brooks and
Mark Shields), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/political-wrap/july-dec05/sb_10-14.html.
14. Lynette Clemetson, Alito Could be 5th Catholic on Current Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
1, 2005, at A23; The Papal Court: The Supreme Court goes over to Rome, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 2006, at
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Although this Essay will address questions raised by these recent events, I
will not offer any opinion about these incidents. Those matters must be left to
historians. As a judge, I am more interested in the present and recurring issue of
the role of religion in judging than in the history of judicial confirmations.
Amidst a lack of consensus on the role of religious faith in judging, I will offer
my perspective on the public duties of an American Catholic judge.
Long before the recent judicial confirmation hearings, there existed a
debate among legal experts about the role of religious faith in judging. In a
1989 lecture at Notre Dame Law School, Yale Law Professor Stephen Carter
argued that "the religiously devout judge ought to be free to rest her moral
knowledge on her religious faith" in the performance of her judicial duty. 15
Other scholars and some judges have since joined in the debate, either to attack
or buttress Professor Carter's argument.'
6
My perspective is that faith properly informs me to take my judicial duty
seriously, but that religion should not be applied as a source of authority in
judging. Although my Catholic faith is the foundation of my worldview, my
public duty is governed, from beginning to end, by the law. Faith properly
matters to a judge, and faith is not in tension with fidelity to the law.
In this Essay, I will address three topics in an effort to explain my
perspective. First, I will discuss how faith can properly motivate an American
Catholic judge. Second, I will examine how the law governs judging. Finally, I
will address a judge's response when moral duty and positive law conflict.
I. How RELIGIOUS FAITH PROPERLY INFORMS
A JUDGE IN FIDELITY TO PUBLIC DUTY
Religious faith properly informs me, as a judge, in my fidelity to my public
duty in at least four ways: in my understanding of my oath of office, in my
moral duties to obey lawful authority, and in my responsibility to work both
diligently and honestly. Each of these ways is motivational; that is, each
concerns the judge's duty to perform his work well. None involves using
religious doctrine to decide a case in conflict with the law.
34; Margaret Ramirez & Manya A. Brachear, With Alito, Catholics Would be Court Majority, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 13, 2006, at C12.
15. Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 943 (1989).
16. See Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decision-Making, 81 MARQ.
L. REV. 513 (1998); Daniel 0. Conkle, Religiously Devout Judges: Issues of Personal Integrity and
Public Benefit, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 523 (1998); Joan B. Gottschall, Response to Judge Wendell Griffen,
81 MARQ. L. REV. 533 (1998); Richard B. Saphire, Religion and Recusal, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 351
(1998); see also Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics
Becoming Justices, 39 DE PAUL L. REV. 1047 (1990); Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 1083 (1990); Howard J. Vogel, The Judicial Oath and the American Creed: Comments
on Sanford Levinson's The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming
Judges, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1107 (1990); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Checking the Artifacts of Canaan: A
Comment on Levinson 's "Confrontation," 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1133 (1990).
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A. Faith and the Judge's Oath of Office
The first and most fundamental way that faith properly matters to me as a
judge is in my understanding of my judicial oath of office. The Framers
required in Article VI of the Constitution that all the officers of our
government, including judges, "be bound by oath or affirmation, to support
th[e] Constitution.' 17 In the next part of that clause, they provided that "no
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public
trust under the United States."' 8 The Framers thought that the particular
religious beliefs of the judge should not matter, but that it was crucial for the
judge to have his conscience-as informed by those beliefs-bound by the
Constitution.
Many of the states had a different rule. Delaware, for example, in article 22
of its Constitution of 1776, required officers to "profess faith in God the Father,
and in Jesus Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for
evermore; and [to]... acknowledge the holy scriptures of the Old and New
Testament to be given by divine inspiration."' 9 Vermont, in chapter 2, section
9, of its Constitution of 1777, required legislators to declare: "I do believe in
one God, the Creator and Governor of the universe, the rewarder of the good
and punisher of the wicked. And I do acknowledge the scriptures of the old and
new testament to be given by divine inspiration, and own and profess the
protestant religion." 20 I am especially grateful that last line of the Vermont
Constitution did not become part of the Federal Constitution.
During the ratification process, some Americans objected to the ban of
religious tests, as many Protestants feared the election or appointment of
Catholics to federal office. James Iredell, a delegate to the North Carolina
convention, provided my favorite rejoinder to these objections when he rose to
defend the ban on religious tests on July 30, 1787. His words were especially
memorable for Catholics. Iredell said,
I met by accident with a pamphlet this morning, in which the author states as a very
serious danger, that the Pope of Rome might be elected President. I confess this
never struck me before, and if the author had read all the qualifications of a
President, perhaps his fears might have been quieted. No man but a native, and who
has resided fourteen years in America, can be chosen President. I know not all the
qualifications for a Pope, but I believe he must be taken from the college of
Cardinals, and probably there are many previous steps necessary before he arrives
at this dignity. A native of America must have very singular good fortune, who after
residing fourteen years in his own country, should go to Europe, enter into Romish
orders, obtain the promotion of Cardinal, afterwards that of Pope, and at length be
so much in the confidence of his own country, as to be elected President. It would
17. U. S. CONST. art. Vt, cl. 3.
18. Id.
19. 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 633-34 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds., 1987).
20. 4 id. at 634.
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be still more extraordinary if he should give up his Popedom for our Presidency.
Sir, it is impossible to treat such idle fears with any degree of gravity.
2 1
"The Framers' general understanding was that proscribing religious tests
did not necessarily remove the religious significance of the general oath. 22
James Madison, the Father of the Constitution, for example, explained in a
letter to Edmund Pendleton dated October 28, 1787, that an oath should make a
religious test unnecessary. Madison wrote:
Is not a religious test as far as it is necessary, or would operate, involved in the oath
itself? If the person swearing believes in the supreme Being who is invoked, and in
the penal consequences of offending him, either in this or a future world or both, he
will be under the same restraint from perjury as if he had previously subscribed a
test requiring this belief. If the person in question be an unbeliever in these points
and would notwithstanding take the oath, a previous test could have no effect. He
would subscribe to it as he would take the oath, without any principle that could be
affected by either.
23
Madison's argument, expressed by others as well, was that a religious
believer would take an oath seriously without need of a religious test, and that a
religious test could be declared by an unprincipled atheist without fear of
punishment after death. Either way, a religious test was unnecessary.
When I placed my left hand on the Holy Bible and swore to "perform all
the duties incumbent upon me as United States Circuit Judge under the
Constitution and laws of the United States; ... and [swore] that I [would] well
and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter[,]
So Help Me God,''24 my conscience was and remains affected by my religious
beliefs. Undoubtedly, the case is the same for all religious judges. Were it not
so, what would be the point of placing my hand on the Bible or ending the oath
with the declaration, "So Help Me God"? Taking a false oath is a violation of
the second commandment not to take the name of the Lord in vain. As the
Catechism of the Catholic Church explains, "[t]aking an oath or swearing is to
take God as witness to what one affirms. It is to invoke the divine truthfulness
21. 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES,
ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION, JAN. TO AUG. 1788, at 906 (B.
Bailyn ed., 1993).
22. THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 295 (E. Meese et al. eds., 2005).
23. JAMES MADISON TO EDMUND PENDLETON, 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 19, at
639.
24. The words of the oath for judicial officers are taken from two statutes, 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2000)
and 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2000). The oath reads as follows:
I, [name], do solemnly swear that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do
equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and
perform all the duties incumbent upon me as [office] under the Constitution and laws of the
United States; and that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against
all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I
take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I
will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So
Help Me God.
THE OATH FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS (on file with author).
25. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH T 2150 (1995).
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as a pledge of one's own truthfulness. An oath engages the Lord's name.''26 My
entire understanding of my judicial duty flows from taking my oath seriously;
James Madison and the other Framers of the Constitution expected nothing
less.
B. Faith and the Duty To Obey Lawful Authority
My religious faith also informs my perspective on my judicial duty to obey
lawful authority. As a Catholic, I believe I have a moral obligation to obey our
government and its laws, while my Christian faith provides the foundation for
my public duty to administer the law. Before I became a judge, this perspective
informed my decision, as the Attorney General of Alabama, to obey a federal
injunction that required the removal of a monument of the Ten Commandments
in the Alabama State Judicial Building.27 My moral duty to obey the law
pertains to my judicial duty now just as it pertained to my executive duty then.
The Christian duty to obey the government and its laws is clearly expressed
in the New Testament. In Saint Matthew's Gospel, Jesus gave a provocative
lesson that, the Catholic Church teaches, involves the moral duty to obey the
government: "[G]ive to Caesar what is Caesar's, but give to God what is
God's." 28 In his Epistle to the Romans, the Apostle Paul taught, "[1]et everyone
obey the authorities that are over him, for there is no authority except from
God, and all authority that exists is established by God., 29 And in his first
Epistle, Peter wrote, "[b]ecause of the Lord, be obedient to every human
institution, whether to the emperor as sovereign or to the governors he
commissions for the punishment of criminals and the recognition of the upright.
Such obedience is the will of God.",
30
As a judge in a government of laws, not men, I have a special moral duty to
obey and enforce the law in accordance with my oath. That moral obligation is
consonant not only with Christian teachings, but also with the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges, which requires judges to avoid impropriety and its
appearance. Canon 2A of that Code requires a judge to "respect and comply
with the law and [to] act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary." 31
My moral duty also requires that, when I exercise judicial authority in
compliance with the law, I must, as a Catholic, "do so as a service." 32 I am
26. Id.
27. William H. Pryor Jr., Christian Duty and the Rule of Law, 34 CUMB. L. REv. 1 (2003); see
generally Moore v. Judicial Inquiry Comm., 891 So. 2d 848 (Ala. 2004).
28. Matthew 22:21 (New American Catholic).
29. Romans 13:1 (New American Catholic).
30. 1 Peter 2:13 (New American Catholic).
31. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2A (1999).
32. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2235.
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bound to follow Christ's teaching: "Anyone among you who aspires to
greatness must serve the rest, and whoever wants to rank first among you must
serve the needs of all.",33 I must strive, in the words of the Catechism, "to
respect the fundamental rights of the human person ... [and] dispense justice
humanely by respecting the rights of everyone, especially of families and the
disadvantaged.,
34
My moral responsibility, as informed by my faith, again conforms with my
oath of office. My oath to "administer justice without respect to persons, and do
equal right to the poor and to the rich' 35 clearly echoes the Catechism's
aforementioned command to respect the "rights of everyone, especially of
families and the disadvantaged., 36 My moral obligation also accords with
Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct, which instructs judges to "be patient,
dignified, respectful, and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and
others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity" 37 and to "require
court officials, staff, and others subject to [my] direction and control, to
observe the same standards of fidelity and diligence."
38
C. Faith and the Duty of Diligence
My faith informs my judicial duty in a third way, by inculcating me with a
belief in the moral duty to work. The Apostle Paul's Second Epistle to the
Thessalonians addresses man's obligation to work by declaring "that anyone
who would not work should not eat."39 The Catechism explains that work is, in
a real sense, a form of prayer:
Human work proceeds directly from persons created in the image of God and called
to prolong the work of creation by subduing the earth, both with and for one
another. Hence work is a duty.... Work honors the Creator's gifts and the talents
received from him. It can also be redemptive. By enduring the hardship of work in
union with Jesus, the carpenter of Nazareth and the one crucified on Calvary, man
collaborates in a certain fashion with the Son of God in his redemptive work. He
shows himself to be a disciple of Christ by carrying the cross, daily, in the work he
is called to accomplish. Work can be a means of sanctification and a way of
animating earthly realities with the Spirit of Christ.
4 0
This religious belief motivates my commitment to my oath to "well and
faithfully discharge the duties of the office ' 4 1 of a circuit judge. Canon 3
33. Matthew 20:26 (New American Catholic).
34. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2237.
35. THE OATH FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS, supra note 24.
36. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2237.
37. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3A(3).
38. Id. Canon 3B(2).
39. 2 Thessalonians 3:10 (New American Catholic).
40. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2427.
41. THE OATH FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS, supra note 24.
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requires that I "perform the duties of the office impartially and diligently, ' 42
obliging me to "dispose promptly of the business of the court' '43 and "diligently




The Catholic judge has a moral duty not only to follow the law, but to
administer justice by enforcing it. My position as a judge enables me to fulfill
my Christian duty to serve others by helping to sustain the American
experiment of liberty in law. In other words, my vocation calls me to serve the
moral enterprise of democratic governance and the rule of law.
D. Faith and the Duty of Honesty
Faith informs my performance as a judge in a fourth way, by teaching me to
be honest. The moral duty of honesty requires both truthfulness in
communication and reasoning and respect for the property of others. This duty
is reflected in the commandments against bearing false witness and stealing,
respectively.
Regarding the former, the Catechism has the following strong words about
the necessity for truth in a judicial system:
When it is made publicly, a statement contrary to the truth takes on a particular
gravity. In court it becomes false witness. When it is under oath, it is perjury. Acts
such as these contribute to condemnation of the innocent, exoneration of the guilty,
or the increased punishment of the accused. They gravely compromise the exercise
of justice and the fairness of judicial decisions.45
That Catholic perspective echoes the most basic secular understanding of
the judicial function, reflected in the first Canon of the Code of Conduct, which
requires a judge to "uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. '" 6
A judge must not only demand truthfulness from witnesses and attorneys; a
judge must be truthful about the business of the judiciary. Litigants, attorneys,
and the public have a right to just decisions and to know the reasons for the
decisions of courts. This means judges must resolve controversies honestly and
provide candid judicial opinions and orders.
The moral duty of honesty also extends, as I mentioned earlier, to the
commandment against stealing, which requires respect for the property of
others. 47 The Catechism explains that "any form of unjustly taking and keeping
the property of others is against the seventh commandment. ' 48 Among the
unjust takings listed in the Catechism are "corruption in which one influences
42. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3.
43. Id. Canon 3A(5).
44. Id. Canon 3B(1).
45. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 12476. (footnotes omitted).
46. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 1.




the judgment of those who must make decisions according to law, 'A9
"appropriation and use for private purposes of the common goods of an
enterprise," 50 and even "work poorly done.
51
This moral duty of honesty in respect for the property of others is reflected
in all of the Canons of the Code of Conduct for Judges that I have mentioned
already: the first Canon, which requires judges to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary, the second Canon, which requires judges to avoid impropriety, and
the third Canon, which requires judges to perform the duties of the office
impartially and diligently.52 A judge must respect the property of the taxpayers
that has been entrusted to the judiciary for the promotion of the common good.
A judge not only has a duty to work, but an obligation to give the taxpayers
honest and skilled work for the salary and benefits he receives, while avoiding
conflicts of interest that would compromise the reputation and integrity of the
judiciary. 53
II. How LAW, NOT RELIGION, MATTERS IN JUDGING
Although my religion properly informs and motivates me to be faithful to
my oath of office and to my moral duties, to obey the government and its laws,
and to work both diligently and honestly, there is a limit to the relevance of
religion in the performance of my judicial duty. That limit is defined by the
very nature of my judicial authority. Properly understood, the exercise of my
authority as a federal judge is governed by the law alone, and that
understanding is where the real controversy exists in the contemporary debate
about judicial authority.
To explain my perspective of my judicial authority, I return to Professor
Carter's argument, in which he described two kinds of judges: First, "the
objective judge;" and second, "the morally sensitive judge."54 I will use these
models for judging to help explain my perspective.
Professor Carter described the objective judge, which embodies my model
for judging, in these terms:
The objective judge considers adjudication an exercise of interpretation, that is, the
application to a text of a set of interpretive rules. The objective judge believes that
the legal community of which she is a part shares a consensus on the interpretive
rules that judges are to apply. Her vision of her role is to discover the rules and to
try to apply them to the cases that come before her. These interpretive rules are
supposed to yield relatively determinate results, which is another way of saying that




52. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canons 1-3.
53. Id. Canon 3C.
54. Carter, supra note 15, at 933-35.
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biases of the interpreter.55
Professor Carter's view of how judging works in reality is personified by
the morally sensitive judge, who "engages quite self-consciously in a form of
reasoning best described as moral philosophy. Indeed, there are cases in which,
if there is to be a decision at all, a degree of reliance on moral conviction can
scarcely be avoided, and might even be desirable." 56 When a federal judge
decides issues of constitutional law, Professor Carter said, "whether the judge
claims to be enforcing the community's moral norms or updating the moral
vision of the Founders, it is quite evident that the judge cannot make such
decisions without relying, at least in part, on her own moral knowledge."
57
To be fair, Professor Carter confessed that he was "sometimes wistful" 58 for
the objective method of judging, but he asserted that "there appears to be a
widely shared expectation that judges will sometimes rely on personal moral
knowledge." 59 Professor Carter also admitted that "the ghost of the objective
judge refuses to go away. .. . [O]nce a judge's moral understanding is
permitted to play a role, the liberal argument cannot distinguish religiously
based knowledge from other moral knowledge .... ,,60 For that reason, he
concluded, "[t]he aspirational model of the objective judge might offer the only
path to sanity."
6 1
If I adhered to the model of the morally sensitive judge, then I would find it
difficult to argue against Professor Carter that a judge should not be permitted
to rely on his religion as a source of authority in reaching decisions. Because of
that difficulty, I agree with Professor Carter that the model of the objective
judge offers a path to sanity in the sense that every citizen-believers of all
faiths and atheists alike-should expect their legal controversies to be resolved
by fair rules adopted in advance by elected authorities. My disagreement with
Professor Carter is with his view that the objective judge is fictitious.
It is amusing to me that, although many law professors argue that the model
of the morally sensitive judge explains how judging actually works, many
judges, who, of course, actually perform that work, disagree with that model.
Three years after Professor Carter delivered his lecture at Notre Dame, for
example, Judge James Buckley of the District of Columbia Circuit published an
essay entitled The Catholic Public Servant,62 in which he explained that "a
judge's task [is] to discern the governing legal principles as objectively as he
55. Id. at 934.
56. Id. at 935 (footnote omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 934.
59. Id. at 935.
60. Carter, supra note 15, at 944.
61. Id.




can, and then to apply them." 63 Judge Buckley argued that a judge's job "is to
give force and effect to the law, whether he agrees with it or not; and that is
responsibility enough., 64 Judge Buckley even went one step further, arguing
that "the justice I am sworn to administer is not justice as I might see it, but
justice as defined by the Constitution and legal traditions of the United States.
And if I consciously deviate from that body of law to do justice as I see it, I
violate my oath of office .... I agree with Judge Buckley. The objective
method of judging is more than alive and well; it is the only legitimate model
for a federal judge.
The duty of a federal judge is unlike that of a legislator or executive.
Alexander Hamilton eloquently provided the following classic exposition of the
judicial role in Federalist 78:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must perceive,
that, in a government in which they are separated from each other, the judiciary,
from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political
rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure
them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules
by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on
the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either
of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for
the efficacy of its judgments. 66
As a judge, I am not given the authority to use a personal moral perspective
to update or alter the text of our Constitution and laws. The business of using
moral judgment to change the law is reserved to the political branches, which is
why the officers of those branches are regularly elected by the people. A
judge's task is limited to serving as an umpire, so that controversies between
citizens and officers of their government may be resolved based on the law. For
that limited task, a federal judge is granted a privilege designed to secure his
independence: life tenure with no reduction in salary.
An officer of a political branch, such as Congress, is free to propose
changes in the law that conform with his perspective of morality, as informed
by his religion. For centuries, members of Congress have supported a variety of
new laws on this kind of basis, whether to abolish slavery, withdraw troops
from foreign wars, abolish child labor, guarantee civil rights, provide assistance
to the poor and sick, protect marriage, or prohibit the sale of intoxicating
liquors. The changing of laws enacted by political authorities is not a judge's
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the jurisdiction of the courts.
Adherence to the model of objective judging does not mean that the task of
judging is either mechanical or easy. The meaning and application of the law is
sometimes difficult to discern, which is why judges in good faith sometimes
disagree. The duty to administer justice requires the exercise of judgment, but
not the employment of religious doctrine as a source of authority to supplant or
evade the law when judging becomes difficult or its outcome undesirable. A
judge who is motivated by moral duties to fulfill his oath and obey the law
must strive to be as objective as possible using traditional methods of
construction, reliance on precedent, and legal reasoning.
The Church makes no claim that judges must be moral philosophers who
are empowered to change the law, as they see fit, in resolving cases. As the
Catechism states, "[t]he Church invites political authorities to measure their
judgments and decisions against ... inspired truth about God and man,"67 but
that statement is not a command that justice be administered by a court contrary
to positive law. In our system, the political authorities who measure the need
for changes to our Constitution and laws, based on the truth about God and
man, are the officers of the legislative and executive branches.
But what if the law of the sovereign conflicts with the natural law? Does
not the Catholic Church, based on the reasoning of St. Augustine and St.
Thomas Aquinas, teach that a violation of natural law cannot be called properly
"law"? 68 My answer is that a federal judge has no authority to use natural law
as a way to subvert the clear commands of the positive law.
69
III. WHEN FAITH AND LAW CONFLICT
Although the objective judge provides the proper model for my work,
objective judging does not allow me to ignore the moral consequences of my
work. As Judge Buckley wrote, "[a] judge, of course, is no more relieved of
moral responsibility for his work than anyone else in either private or public
life."7° The Catechism explains, "[f]reedom makes man a moral subject. When
he acts deliberately, man is, so to Speak, the father of his acts. Human acts, that
is, acts that are freely chosen in consequence of a judgment of conscience, can
be morally evaluated. They are either good or evil.'
That brings me to my final topic: What happens when my judicial duty and
my moral duty, as informed by my religion, conflict? I will first address in what
67. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2244.
68. See Levinson, supra note 16, at 1074.
69. Id. at 1075-76 n.85 (quoting a letter from Professor Robert George of Princeton University
regarding Justice Scalia's view that "his duty as a judge is to determine the meaning of the positive law
and render judgment accordingly").
70. Buckley, supra note 62, at 2.
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kinds of circumstances there would be a conflict of judicial and moral duties,
and I will then address the proper response to that conflict. Fortunately, there is
a rich body of Catholic teaching available to assist a judge in identifying a
conflict, 72 and there is a simple remedy in law for judges to avoid the conflict
after it has been identified.
When does the performance of a judicial act become morally unacceptable?
The answer is rarely. Ordinarily the immoral act of a party does not make the
judge assigned to his case responsible for that immoral act. The Catechism
teaches that "[t]he morality of human acts depends on: [1] the object chosen;
[2] the end in view or the intention; [and] [3] the circumstances of the action., 73
Furthermore, "[a] morally good act requires the goodness of the object, of the
end, and of the circumstances together. An evil end corrupts the action, even if
the object is good in itself (such as praying and fasting 'in order to be seen by
men')., 74 Conversely, "[a] good intention ... does not make behavior that is
intrinsically disordered... good or just. The end does not justify the means. 75
Two kinds of cooperation with evil must be avoided. The first is called
formal cooperation, which occurs when the cooperator shares the evil intent of
the actor.76 Formal cooperation with evil is always morally wrong,77 but it is an
unlikely problem for a judge who must apply the law impartially-that is,
without adopting, as the judge's own end, the object sought by a party who
seeks relief from a court.
The other (and, for a judge, more likely) kind of cooperation with evil is
called material cooperation. Material cooperation occurs when the cooperator
assists the actor by performing an act that is not necessarily evil. 78 Whether
material cooperation is morally acceptable depends on whether there is a sound
reason for the cooperation (such as avoiding a worse harm), whether the
cooperation is remote or proximate, and whether the cooperator avoids the
danger of scandal. 79 The graver the evil, then the more serious the reason for
cooperation must be to be justifiable.
Two of these conditions for material cooperation are ordinarily satisfied in
the performance of judicial work. First, a judge has more than a good reason to
apply the law impartially in every case, because the performance of that duty in
a constitutional republic is a fundamental safeguard for the protection of human
liberty. The resources of the judiciary are also scarce, so a judge is ordinarily
72. See 3 GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS 871-97
(1997).
73. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1 1750.
74. Id. 1755.
75. Id. 1753.
76. 3 GRISEZ, supra note 72, at 873.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 876-89.
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obliged to perform his share of the work of the judiciary. Second, the
performance of the judicial function is likely to be remote from the intended
evil act of the party before the court; the typical scenario is where the judge
determines that the law does not empower the government to interfere with a
third party's choice to commit an immoral act.
A judge needs to be attentive to the third condition for acceptable material
cooperation: avoiding scandal, which the Catechism defines as "an attitude or
behavior which leads another to do evil.",80 The Catechism explains that
"[a]nyone who uses the power at his disposal in such a way that it leads others
to do wrong becomes guilty of scandal and responsible for the evil that he has
directly or indirectly encouraged., 81 The Catechism also states that "[s]candal
can be provoked by laws or institutions, by fashion or opinion." 82 For judges
and lawyers there is a special danger of scandal, because "[s]candal is grave
when given by those who by nature or office are obliged to teach and educate
others."
83
There are some circumstances of material cooperation that raise serious
issues of proximity and potential scandal. A Catholic trial judge in a state court
who must decide whether to sentence a murderer to death or grant permission
for a minor to have an abortion would have to consider whether he is
proximately cooperating with an evil act and avoiding scandal; however, a
federal judge is less likely to face this kind of proximity or potential scandal.
Catholic legal scholars have concluded, for example, that a federal appellate
judge does not either proximately cooperate with a potential evil or cause
scandal when he upholds a death sentence: "To affirm a sentence is not to
approve it, but to say that the trial court did its job. 84
The more likely scenario for a federal judge is that his cooperation with the
evil act of another will be remote, dictated by law, and faithful to a duty that
more often protects our freedom in a noble and necessary manner. Allow me an
example outside of the judicial realm: A mail carrier respects the rules of
privacy and prompt delivery for get well cards, boxes of Holy Bibles, and
lifesaving medications, while following the same rules for delivering
pornography. A judge similarly applies the law impartially in a variety of cases
in which the law protects the poor, victims of wrongdoing, the integrity of the
family, and religious freedom, and the judge respects the law when it does not
empower him to prevent a third party from committing an immoral act.
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Pope John Paul II created a stir in January 2002 when he said in an address
to a Church marriage tribunal that "professionals in the field of civil law should
avoid being personally involved in anything that might imply a cooperation
with divorce," 85 but the Holy Father recognized, in even this context, that
judges differ from lawyers. He explained, "for judges, this may prove difficult,
since the legal order does not recognize a conscientious objection to exempt
them from giving sentence. For grave and proportionate motives they may
therefore act in accord with the traditional principles of material cooperation."
86
Although the teaching of the Church about material cooperation makes it
unlikely that a federal judge will proximately cooperate with evil or cause
scandal, there is a simple remedy when that rare problem arises. The judge
should recuse himself. If the judge cannot perform his legal duty, without
violating his moral duty, then the judge must honor both duties by recusal. The
judge honors the law by refusing to disobey it, as that would violate his oath,
and the judge honors his faith by avoiding cooperation with evil, as that would
violate his conscience. The judge cannot be impartial to his moral duty, and
Canon 3 requires a judge to "disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned., 87 The law
acknowledges that judges, in rare cases, should step aside.
CONCLUSION
Although I will not offer an opinion about the recent incidents involving
Catholics nominated to federal judgeships, Catholics should welcome a
conversation about the religious faith of federal judges. We are having this
conversation because Catholics are increasingly being asked to serve in
positions of trust in the American government. We have moved beyond the
harsh expressions of bigotry when Al Smith was nominated to be President and
the debate that arose when John F. Kennedy was so elected. We are no longer
speaking of a single Catholic seat on the Supreme Court, as we were when
President Eisenhower nominated William Brennan to serve as an associate
justice.
We are having this conversation because many Americans recognize that
Catholics are called to take seriously the teachings of the Church; hopefully,
that recognition is based upon the examples of an engaged, informed, and
faithful laity. That recognition is undoubtedly influenced by the recent decades
of evangelism of the late Pope John Paul II, and his fulfillment of the Second
85. Pope John Paul 11, Address to the Prelate Auditors, Officials and Advocates of the Tribunal of
the Roman Rota (Jan. 28, 2002), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/speeches/
2002/january/documents/hf..jp-ii_spe 20020128_roman-rota.en.html (alterations in original) (emphasis
omitted).
86. Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted).
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Vatican Council. It is refreshing to hear Americans ask whether Catholicism
makes a difference in the lives of its adherents, because there is a positive
answer.
As anti-Catholicism still persists in parts of American culture, this latest
controversy about Catholic Americans presents a splendid opportunity to be
witnesses for both the Gospel and our allegiance to the Constitution. This
kairos calls Catholics to advance the work of Father John Courtney Murray, an
American Jesuit theologian whose 1960 book, We Hold These Truths,
88
explained and celebrated the Catholic commitment to the American
Proposition. Father Murray explained,
Catholic participation in the American consensus has been full and free, unreserved
and unembarrassed, because the contents of this consensus - the ethical and
political principles drawn from the tradition of natural law - approve themselves to
the Catholic intelligence and conscience. Where this kind of language is talked, the
Catholic joins the conversation with complete ease. It is his language. The ideas
expressed are native to his own universe of discourse.
89
This conversation also gives Catholics the opportunity to remind our fellow
Americans about the first principles of the founding of our Republic. As Father
Murray wrote,
Part of the inner architecture of the American ideal of freedom has been the
profound conviction that only a virtuous people can be free. It is not an American
belief that free government is inevitable, only that it is possible, and that its
possibility can be realized only when the people as a whole are inwardly governed
by the recognized imperatives of the universal moral law.
... In this sense democracy is more than a political experiment; it is a spiritual and
moral enterprise. And its success depends upon the virtue of the people who
undertake it.
Catholic judges are friends of the Constitution. We are loyal to its promises
and protections. It is our privilege to fulfill our oaths to support and defend the
Constitution of the United States.
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